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Will No-Fault Insurance Cost More Or Less?
C. Arthur Williams, Jr.
Whether no-fault automobile insurance will cost more or less than insurance
under the present tort system is one of the most debated topics of the day. For
some the answer will determine whether they will support or oppose adoption
of some no-fault approach either in their state or nationwide. Because the
outcome of the no-fault debate is uncertain and cost is one of its most important
criteria, it deserves careful examination.
The purposes of this paper are: (I) to discuss the basic factors that affect the
cost of automobile insurance under any system and to show how changes in
these factors affect the premium costs. (2) to summarize briefly the pioneering
costing effort of Frank Harwayne. (3) to describe in some detail why the Ameri-
can Insurance Association predicts substantial savings if their no-fault plan is
adopted. (4) to show why the American Mutual Insurance Alliance. using AIA
data. believes most costs will be reduced only slightly under the AIA plan and
the costs for some coverages will actually increase. (5) to discuss the modified
AIA approach used by the New York State Insurance Department, and (6) to
demonstrate how sensitive the AIA estimates are to changes in several basic
assumptions. and on this basis to predict whether no-fault plans will cost more
or less.
Basic Cost Factors
An insurance premium can be divided into two components: the provision for
losses and the provision for expenses and profits. The three coverages most
affected by the conversion to a no-fault plan are bodily injury liability, property
damage liability, and collision coverage. The premiums charged for these
coverages by those twelve insurers whose experience was included in the
American Insurance Association cost study can be allocated as follows:'
* Dean of the School of Business Administration. University of Minnesota.
I. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVAL-
UATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
REPARATIONS exhibit I, sheet 2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as AIA REPORT].
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Bodily injury Property damage
liability liability Collision
Losses 55.0% 56.5% 54.4%
Expenses
Loss adjustment expense 10.5% 9.0% 7. 1%
General administration
expense 6.5% 6.5% 6.5%
Other expense and profit 28.0% 28.0% 32.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Comprehensive insurance, which covers most physical damage losses other than
collision (e.g.. fire and theft losses), would not be affected by any proposed
change in the legal system.' The premium is most affected by changes in the
provision for losses for several reasons. First, over half the premium is used to
pay losses. Second. loss adjustment expenses tend to vary proportionately with
the losses. Third, other expenses, except for general administration expenses,
are usually budgeted as a percentage of the premium charged. Hence. if the
premium is reduced to reflect favorable loss experience, these other expenses will
be also reduced unless the percentage relationship is changed. Similarly. if the
premium is increased to reflect unfavorable loss experience, other expenses will
also be increased.
The losses paid by an insurer depend upon both the number of the claims it
pays and upon the size of the average claim. Thus, if the number of claims
increases by 25 percent, but the average claim size is reduced by 50 percent,
the amount paid in losses will be reduced by 37.5 percent. If the number of
claims increases by 50 percent but the average claim size is reduced by only 25
percent, the claims paid will increase by 12.5 percent. Perhaps a series of
examples will serve to illustrate this point.
The Relationship of Losses to Claims and Claim Size
If the provision for losses is changed by a specific percentage, the loss adjust-
ment expenses are also changed by the same percentage, the dollars required
for general administration are held at the same dollar amount, and if the other
expenses are held at the same percentage of the final premium, the effects on
the total bodily injury liability premium would be as follows:
2. It should be noted that this premium breakdown is not representative for some of the leading
insurers. Because these insurers market their product through exclusive agents or sales representa-
tives, they have been able to reduce their selling expenses below those indicated above. Conse-
















Both percentages would be the same except for the constant dollar assumption
for general administration expenses, which tempers the change in either direc-
tion. However. if in addition to the changes in the other items stated above the
cost of adjusting each dollar of losses was cut in half, the resulting percentage









If instead of reducing the relative cost of adjusting claims, the percentage of
the premium allocated for "other expenses and profit" was reduced from 28















But. if the loss adjustment expenses and the "other" expenses both were
















However, achieving these reductions would require substantial decreases in
loss adjustment and "other" expenses. For example, if the premium was origi-
19721
Catholic University Law Review
nally $100, the premium breakdown and percentage reduction in each compo-
nent accompanying the 30 percent reduction in the loss provision would be as
follows:
Original Revised Premium
$100 premium Amount Percentage reduction
Losses $ 55.00 $38.50 30%
Expenses
Loss adjustment expense $ 10.50 3.68 65% 7
General administration _ 60%
expense 6.50 6.50 0%
Other expenses and profit 28.00 7.92 72%
$100.00 $56.60 43%
There is much interest in whether the percentage of the premium allocated
to losses would be higher under a no-fault system. For this to be true, the
expense component must be reduced (or increased) by a higher (or lower)
percentage than the loss component. The percentage decrease (or increase) in
the premium will then be more (or less) than the percentage increase in the loss
component.
The Harwayne Approach
Frank Harwayne was the first person to estimate the change in premium if a
no-fault plan were adopted. During 1966-68 Harwayne investigated the relative
costs of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan and the present system for
Michigan and New York.3 Only the second of his New York studies, which
followed closely the Michigan methodology, will be discussed here. According
to this analysis, Basic Protection Plan coverage ($10,000 no-fault coverage)
plus $10,000/$20,000 out-of-state tort liability insurance coverage' would cost
25 percent less than $10.000/$20,000 bodily injury liability insurance, including
uninsured motorists coverage, and $2,000 medical payments insurance. A sim-
plified explanation of that analysis follows.
3. See Harwayne, Insurance Cost of Automobile Basic Protection Plan in Relation to Automo-
bile Bodily Injury Liability Costs. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY 122-58
(1966). See also F. HARWAYNE, AUTOMOBILE BASIC PROTECTION COST EVALUATED (1968) and
Harwayne, Insurance Cost of Basic Protection Plan in Michigan, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 119-
77 (R. Keeton, J. O'Connell & J. McCord eds. 1968).
4. Plus optional removal of the wage loss deductible feature-S100 or, if higher, ten percent of




About 53 percent of the premium charged for insurance under the present
system was supposed to cover losses. Comparing the total number of personal
injuries in traffic accidents as reported to police authorities with the number of
bodily injury claims paid by automobile insurers under the present system.
Harwayne concluded that the Basic Protection Plan would produce about 28
percent more claims. He further concluded that this figure should be reduced
by about six percent to represent claims that were currently paid and would
continue to be paid by self-insurers, and by another four percent to represent
claims that would be paid by workmen's compensation cases. By an ingenious
integration of workmen's compensation insurance, motor vehicle, and labor
force data, he estimated that under the Basic Protection Plan the average
economic loss, subject to a $10.000 maximum, would be $618. This was 25
percent less than the average tort claim of $825.
Collateral source benefits (i.e.. medicare. private medical expense insurance.
and private loss of income insurance) were expected to reduce the average claim
($618) by 27 percent-to $453. This reduction was based on the proportion of
the population known to have the various health insurance coverages and the
estimated effect of each coverage on the losses to which they applied. Reducing
income losses by 15 percent to reflect tax savings would further reduce the
average claim by ten percent.5
All expenses other than those attributable to claims adjustment were assumed
to be fixed at the same percentage of the final premium as at present. That
proportion of the claims expense allocable to specific claims (currently about
eight percent of the premium) was expected to be halved, but an additional
allowance had to be made for the half of the claimant's attorneys' fees that the
Plan charged against the insurer. The net result was a ten percent reduction in
this item. Unallocated claims expense was expected to remain at the same dollar
amount. The resulting Basic Protection Plan premium was then increased nine
percent to reflect the higher per accident limit (100,000) of the Basic Protection
Plan.
According to these calculations pure Basic Protection Plan insurance, when
compared with $10.000/$20.000 bodily injury insurance, including uninsured
motorists coverage, and $2,000 medical payments insurance, would save the
insured 32 percent. The addition of tort liability insurance to protect him
against the pain and suffering suits in excess of $5,000 which were permitted
under the plan and against out-of-state tort liability coverage would reduce
these savings to 25 percent.
5. AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE ALLIANCE, ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE
COSTING OF THE AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS "COMPLETE PERSONAL PROTECTION AUTO-
MOBILE PLAN" exhibit VI (1969) [hereinafter cited as AMIA REPORT].
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In two alternative computations Harwayne changed the nature of his claims
adjustment expense assumption. In one he assumed a 75 percent savings in
allocated claims adjustment expense and a 25 percent saving in unallocated
claims expense. The second alternative resulted in no savings in claims expense.
The savings under the first alternative were 31 percent. under the second 20
percent.
The reduction in the provision for losses, made possible by the reduction in
the average Basic Protection Plan claim, produced most of the estimated sav-
ings. The restriction on pain and suffering awards was the single most impor-
tant savings factor although collateral source offsets also played an important
role.
The American Insurance Association Study
In order to permit more accurate costing than is possible using regularly pub-
lished sources, the American Insurance Association gathered comprehensive
data on the bodily injury losses and property damage sustained in two accident
samples in seven states in early 1968.6 The objective of the AIA study was to
determine how much it would cost insurers to pay the losses arising out of these
sample accidents on a no-fault basis compared with the payments made under
the present tort system. The methodology is too detailed to discuss here in depth
but the basic procedure will be outlined briefly.
Bodily Injury Coverages
For the bodily injury coverages most attention centered on the 9.114 injuries
reported for accidents involving private passenger cars with bodily injury and
medical payments coverage. It was assumed that the presence of medical pay-
ments coverage would reveal persons injured in the policyholder's car even if
no negligence was involved.7 However, comparison of injuries in the insured car
with those in the other car suggested that some upward adjustment should be
made in the number of injuries to occupants of insured cars. Out-of-state claims
also appeared to be under-represented and were adjusted upward. Of the 10,068
adjusted injuries. 5.342 were closed during the survey period.' Estimates were
made of the proportion of these closed cases with economic losses of various
sorts, the average loss sustained, the proportion with collateral source recover-
6. AIA REPORT 13.
7. Id.
8. Id. at exhibitLl.
9. AIA REPORT (Appendix), Table A-I.
[Vol. 21:405
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ies. the average collateral source recovery, the proportion with tort recoveries.
and the average tort recovery.
On the basis of this data the AIA concluded that, under the present system.
4.243 persons out of the 10.068 would have tort claims against the twleve
insurers involved-the average claim being $1.034. Under a no-fault plan. 5,392
persons would collect from these insurers, their average economic loss being
$584. The claim frequency would increase 27 percent: the average economic loss
would be 44 percent less than the average tort settlement, Consequently the total
economic losses of covered victims would be only 72 percent of the tort settle-
ments under the present system."'
The AIA plan. however, would not pay the victim's entire loss. Further cost
reductions totalling 7.4 percent would be produced by a 15 percent reduction
for tax savings, a $750 per month limit, and collateral source recoveries."
Collateral source recoveries under the AIA Plan are limited to Medicare and
Old Age. Survivors, and Disability Insurance. The sample data, however, also
revealed the substantial effect of other collateral sources, particularly group
hospital insurance. Because these insurers could recover some of' the monies
paid out through subrogation actions against negligent drivers in out-of-state
accidents, a small reduction in cost was also possible from this source. How-
ever. the insurers would have to continue to provide protection against tort suits
that might be permitted in other states. The original AIA plan also provided
some special impairment benefits. The sample data were used to estimate the
cost of these benefits. 2
As shown in Table Two, the net effect of these cost factors was an estimated
reduction of 22 percent in the provision for losses. Expenses and profits were
expected to be reduced even more-by 28 percent. General administration costs
were assumed to remain at the same dollar amount. "Other" expenses and
profits were to remain at the same percentage of the final premium. Loss
adjustment expenses. however, were expected to decline from 19 percent of
losses to I I percent of losses (19 percent on serious claims but only five percent.
the individual health insurance percentage, on non-serious claims).
3
The composite effect of these changes was an estimated 25 percent reduction
for persons currently purchasing $10,000/$20,000 bodily injury liability insur-
ance. including uninsured motorists coverage." If the limits in this comparison
10. See Appendix, Table One.
II. See Appendix, Table Two.
12. See AIA REPORT exhibit II. sheets 1-3.
13. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheets 2,3.
14. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheet 2.
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package were raised to $25.000/$50,000 and $1.000 medical payments was
added. the savings would be 44 percent because the only change required under
the no-fault plan to produce equivalent protection would be to raise the out-of-
state liability coverage limits. 5 The elimination of compensation for pain and
suffering would produce most of the savings predicted by the AIA actuaries.
Collateral source recoveries would be a minor factor. Savings on loss adjust-
ment expenses would also be significant.
Property Damage Coverages
The AIA also predicted savings of 14 percent on property damage coverages
for the average insured who currently purchases $5,000 property damage liabil-
ity insurance and collision insurance with a deductible of $77.6 The $77 figure
was used because it is the average amount purchased. 17
Loss savings, calculated at eight percent," were attributed entirely to the fact
that tort liability for damage to cars would be eliminated under the Plan thus
shifting all these losses to the deductible collision coverage. Expenses were
assumed to decrease 21 percent. Loss adjustment expenses were expected to
drop to ten percent of losses.' 9 Previously they were 16 percent under present
property damage liability insurance and 13 percent under present collision
insurance. 2 The general administration expenses were expected to remain at the
same dollar amount and the "other expenses" at the same percentage of the
final premium. 2'
This 14 percent savings22 on the property coverages. coupled with the 44
percent savings2 calculated for the bodily injury coverage, produced a 29 per-
cent savings for a person currently purchasing the following package:24
$25,000/$50,000 Bodily injury liability insurance
$10,000/$20,000 Uninsured motorists coverage
$1,000 Medical payments insurance
$5,000 Property damage liability insurance
$77 deductible Collision insurance
15. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheet I.
16. Id.
17. AIA REPORT 14.
18. AIA REPORT exhibit IX, sheet 1.
19. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheet 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See note 16 and accompanying text.
23. See note 15 and accompanying text.
24. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheet I.
[Vol. 21i:405
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Because most persons purchasing such a package also purchase and will con-
tinue to purchase comprehensive insurance, the estimated savings on the total
package would be somewhat less than 29 percent.
The .-l nerican Mutual Insurance .4 Iliance Critique
The American Mutual Insurance Alliance severely criticized the AIA esti-
mates.2 5 For the package just described, the AMIA predicted only a nine per-
cent decrease instead of the AIA's 29 percent decrease."6 If the medical pay-
ments insurance were omitted from the comparison and the bodily injury liabil-
ity insurance limits were retained at $10.000/$20000. the AMIA predicted a
five percent increase in the package premium instead of a 19 percent decrease.
27
The AMIA did not quarrel with the estimated savings on the property coverages
but it did point out that owners who formerly collected the full amount of
damage to their cars from negligent drivers of other cars would, under the new
system. bear the cost themselves up to the deductible amount.
Instead of the 25 percent saving for the person who currently purchases
$10,000/$20,000 bodily injury liability insurance, including uninsured motorists
coverage, the AMIA estimated a 29 percent increase."5 The AMIA was of the
opinion that AIA actuaries underestimated both the pure loss costs and expen-
ses under the new system."E
The AMIA adjusted the AIA estimated pure loss costs to produce an increase
of almost 37 percent instead of savings of 22 percent."' Of the 28.8 percent in
additional income losses. 19.2 percent was attributable to survivorship benefits
in death cases which the AMIA believed the AIA had omitted in its analysis.
3 '
Permanent partial claims, also believed to have been omitted from the AIA
estimate, were added, as well as payments to persons totally and permanently
disabled beyond the 99 week maximum recognized by the AIA. 3 These adjust-
ments were based in part on a special 1961 AMIA claims study and workmen's
compensation data. In addition AMIA estimated that compensable injuries
under a no-fault plan would be 65 percent higher than under the tort system-a
30 percent increase in total claims over the AIA estimate.3 3 This estimate was
25. See AMIA REPORT 1-6.
26. AMIA REPORT 7.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1-3.
30. Compare Appendix. Table Two. with Table Three.
31. AMIA REPORT 10.
32. Id.
33. AMIA REPORT 54.
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based on: (I) the fact that four of six independent United States studies have
produced ratios of 55 to 70 percent and (2) a recalculation of the AIA study
indications on the basis of "reasonable" data adjustments.34 Specifically, the
percentage of occupants in the other car receiving tort liability settlements was
adjusted downward and the number of single-car injuries was increased.
The AMIA accepted the AIA expense assumptions except that loss adjust-
ment expenses under the no-fault system were assumed to be 14.5 percent 5 of
losses instead of I I percent 6 because of the greater relative frequency of serious
losses.
The New York State Insurance Department Study
Because the New York State Insurance Department was able (I) to use the AIA
sample for New York as its data base and (2) to recognize the AMIA criticisms
of the AIA approach, its study merits particular attention.
Bodily Injury Coverages
The New York Department actuaries estimated that the Department plan
would reduce by 37 percent the provision for losses in the premium for
$10.000/$20,000 bodily injury liability insurance, including uninsured motor-
ists coverage. 7 The estimate differs from the AIA estimate for several reasons.
First, the New York Department no-fault proposal differs in three significant
respects from the original A IA proposal.,it would deduct more collateral source
benefits from the automobile benefits. The entire cost of accidents involving
commercial vehicles and private passenger vehicles would be borne by the com-
mercial vehicle. For special constitutional reasons, the present tort action would
be retained for survivorship benefits in death cases.
Second, the calculations were based on the New York portion of the seven-
state sample.
Third, in response to the AMIA criticisms of the AlA study. some adjust-
ments were made in the AIA methodology. The proportion of single-car acci-
dents in the sample was adjusted upward by 28 percent to the proportion
indicated by motor vehicle accident reports. Although few of these cases were
34. AMIAREPORTI1.
35. AIA REPORT exhibit I, sheet 3.
36. See Appendix, Table Four.
37. N.Y. INS. DEPT., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . .FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?, Actuarial Supple-
ment at 18-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. SUPPLEMENT].
[Vol. 21!:405
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expected to exceed $100, they were valued at over $300 or half of the reported
injury average.35 The average bodily injury settlement value was based on claims
closed both during and before the survey. Nationally these claims had a lower
average settlement value than those closed during the survey-the figure used
in the AIA study. Loss costs under the proposed system were increased to
recognize: (I) the additional cost of permanent disability cases beyond the first
99 weeks included in the AIA study39 and (2) deferred benefits for disabled
children.4 0 The New York Department actuaries assumed considerably fewer
permanent cases than the AMIA actuaries, higher OASDI offsets which sub-
stantially reduced the average loss, and a mortality table and interest rate (five
percent instead of three percent) which produced lower present values.', The
cost of death cases was also increased but, because of the special feature of the
New York law dealing with these claims, this addition was limited (except for
a small upward adjustment) to the cost of death cases under the present system.
The average value of such cases was only $6,555.11
Finally, the New York study expected general administration expenses to be
reduced. More specifically, general administration expenses were assumed to be
6.5 percent of the premium under the new system.
Property Damage Coverages
Property damage liability and collision insurance premium savings were esti-
mated at 16 percent." This estimate would have been 12 percent but for the
strict liability of commercial vehicles." The methodology was the same as that
used by the AIA except that general administration expenses were expected to
be 6.5 percent of the final premium. The New York experience, however, dif-
fered from the seven-state sample in that the reduction achieved by shifting
property damage liability losses to a deductible basis was 6.8 percent, not 8.1
percent, of present system loss costs.
Sensitivity ol Cost Estimates
In evaluating any cost estimate it is instructive to know how sensitive the
estimate is to changes in key variables within a plausible range. As noted earlier,
loss frequency and loss severity are two key variables.45 According to the AIA,
the number of bodily injury claims under its plan would increase 27.1 percent
38. N.Y. SUPPLEMENT 28.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 30-32.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id. at 64.
44. Id. at 61-62.
45. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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and the average no-fault benefit payment would be 56.0 percent of the average
claim under the present system. The corresponding AMIA percentages are 65
percent and 78.8 percent. Table Five shows how, according to AIA methodol-
ogy. the savings on $10,000/$20,000 bodily injury liability insurance including
uninsured motorists coverage would vary under twelve pairs of assumptions
regarding claim frequency and claim severity. The three frequency assumptions
are the AlA assumption. the AMIA assumption, and an intermediate assump-
tion. The four severity assumptions are the AIA assumption, the AMIA as-
sumption. an intermediate assumption. and a high assumption that is the same
distance above the AMIA assumption as the intermediate assumption is below
it.
The savings in Table Five range from 25 percent to 47 percent. The most
likely range. however, is II percent to 29 percent for the following reasons. AIA
actuaries apparently underestimated the cost of permanent disability cases and
survivorship cases in their original study." The AMIA. on the other hand, has
been accused of erring in the other direction. Department of Transportation
data on (I) the -personal and family" economic losses sustained by families
with fatalities and (2) their tort recoveries suggest a severity assumption about
midway between the second and third assumption in the Table. In evaluating
these savings one must remember that the insured currently purchasing this
minimum coverage would have much more comprehensive protection for him-
self, his family, and guests in his car.
If the AlA savings estimate on property damage coverages are accepted. the
savings on bodily injury and property damage coverables would vary from 29
percent to 52 percent.1
7
The inclusion of comprehensive insurance in the comparison package would
reduce the savings slightly because the cost of comprehensive would not be
affected by the conversion to no-fault insurance.
Conclusion
This review of leading cost studies. coupled with some elementary sensitivity
analysis, suggests that no-fault insurance would cost less than automobile insur-
ance under the present system. Indeed the savings could be substantial but they
could also be substantially less than claimed by no-fault's most enthusiastic
supporters. A more comprehensive sensitivity analysis is required to make more
definite statements.
46. AMIA REPORT 1,2.
47. See Appendix, Table Six.
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APPENDIX
TABLE ONE
ECONOMIC LOSSES SUSTAINED UNDER THE AMERICAN INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION PLAN COMPARED WITH BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER THE PRESENT
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TABLE TWO
Loss COSTS UNDER AIA PLAN EXPRESSED AS PERCENT OF Loss PAYMENTS
UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM ($10.000/$20,000 BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
INSURANCE AND UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE)
Economic losses 71.7%
-- Reductions for losses not covered -
Medical expense collateral deductions -1.5
15% tax deductible -4.0
$750 per month limitation on income
loss -1.7 -- 8.7
Income loss collateral deductions -0.2
Subrogation of out-of-state accidents
where other driver is at fault -I .3
+ Residual liability to $15,000/$30,000 on out-of-state
accidents +6.7




AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE ALLIANCE MODIFICATION OF AMERICAN
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION Loss COST
Percent of present
system loss cost
ATA pure loss cost 71.2%
excluding residual liability
Net additional income loss 28,8
Total pure loss costs excluding 100.0%
residual liability before compensable
injury frequency adjustment
Total cost after compensable injury
frequency adjustment (1.30 x 100.0%) 130.0%
AIA cost of residual liability 6.7
Total loss cost 136.7%
Source: American Mutual Insurance Alliance, Actuarial Report on the Adequacy of the Costing
of the American Insurance Association's "Complete Personal Protection Automobile Insurance
Plan" exhibit III, at 9 (1969).
197
















Additional cost of long-term cases








Average income tax offset
No out-of-state no-fault benefits




10/20 Liability for death cases
Total





















Source: N.Y. Ins. Dep't, Automobile Insurance . . . For Whose Benefit? Actuarial Supplement
9(1970).
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TABLE FOUR
ESTIMATE BODILY INJURY Loss COSTS UNDER NEW YORK NO-FAULT
PROPOSAL COMPARED WITH PAYMENTS UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM
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TABLE FIVE
SAVINGS UNDER No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PERSON Now PURCHASING
$10,000/$20,000 BODILY INJURY LIABILITY INSURANCE AND UNINSURED
MOTORISTS COVERAGE AS A FUNCTION OF CLAIM FREQUENCY AND CLAIM
SEVERITY
Average No-Fault Benefit







Claim Frequency Under No-Fault System


















SAVINGS UNDER NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PERSON Now PURCHASING
COMMON PACKAGE* OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY AND PHYSICAL DAMAGE
INSURANCE AS A FUNCTION OF BODILY INJURY CLAIM FREQUENCY AND CLAIM
SEVERITY
Average No-Fault Benefit






Bodily Injury Claim Frequency Under
No-Fault System as a Percent of Claim
















Bodily injury liability insurance
Uninsured motorists coverage
Medical payments insurance
Property damage liability insurance
Average deductible collision insurance.
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